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I should like to address primarily..the question of justification for
intervention. I start with a proposition that I think we are all
agreed upon: intervention is prima facie unlawful in internal con-
flict. In short, it must be supported by one or another of a cluster
of justifying principles. I should like to consider two of those prin-
ciples that Professor Moore touched upon: the first is the principle
of humanitarian intervention, and the second is the matter of as-
sistance at request, that is to say, the question of a little help from
one's friends.
First, let us consider the question of humanitarian intervention
in internal conflicts. The argument that intervention is justifiable
on humanitarian grounds is quite simply not on. It is not on in
terms of the black letter rules of the relevant international docu-
ments; it is not on in terms of state practice; and, it is not on be-
cause it is bad policy.
Let me start with the black letter rules. Professor Moore men-
tioned in passing article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations
Charter, which provides that all Members shall refrain in their in-
ternational relations from the threat or use of force against the ter-
ritorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Na-
tions.' Professor Moore also made the point that if one is searching
for ambiguity in that language, ambiguity that might perhaps jus-
tify the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, one can seize upon
the words "against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state" and argue that humanitarian intervention is
not such an activity. It seems to me that the preparatory work of
the Charter belies such an interpretation. Those words were not
meant to leave a loophole of that nature." Furthermore, if one
reads the General Assembly statements on the subject, the Decla-
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ration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Af-
fairs of States (1965),a the Declaration on Principles of Interna-
tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among
States (1970),' and the Definition of Aggression (1974), 5 the black
letter rules again are quite clear. They do not support a doctrine of
humanitarian intervention.
One may, of course, discount black letter rules as simply utter-
ances on symbolic occasions which are not to be taken seriously. I
turn, therefore, to the question of practice. Tom Franck and Nigel
Rodley's analysis of the 19th and 20th century cases of so-called
humanitarian intervention completely demolishes the argument
that state practice supports humanitarian intervention.6 One might
also mention in this context the two most recent cases on which an
argument has been based for a doctrine of humanitarian interven-
tion: Uganda and Cambodia. It is important to note that in neither
of those instances did the intervening powers rely upon a doctrine
of humanitarian intervention to support their activity; Tanzania
made no such claim with respect to its invasion of Uganda, and
Vietnam made no such claim with respect to its invasion of
Cambodia.
Further, in the Cambodian conflict, our side, that is to say, the
United States and the People's Republic of China, has expressly
taken the position that Vietnam was wrong in its actions. We have
done this by support for the Pol Pot regime in the retention of its
seat at the United Nations.7 Nothing could be a clearer condemna-
tion of any notion of humanitarian intervention than our diplo-
matic support for the butcher of three million people who were
deposed by the Vietnamese.
Indeed, in looking at the literature, the only recent instances
that I could find of some expressed reliance on doctrines of hu-
manitarian intervention by an intervening government were the
somewhat half-hearted claims by the United States in the Domini-
can Republic in 19658 and by Indonesia in its shabby invasion of
East Timor in 1975.9 In the Dominican Republic the argument
" G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965).
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G.A. Res. 3314, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
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was, of course, belied by the disproportionality of the actions by
the United States.10 In Timor, so-called humanitarian intervention
was combined with a spurious invitation from a non-government
and was factually unsupportable since the internal fighting, itself
engineered by Indonesia, had ceased with the victory of the Fre-
tilin forces long before Indonesia intervened."' Humanitarian inter-
vention was a thin smoke screen for aggression and annexation.
The Indonesian example demonstrates that it is not just the
United States, the USSR, or other Big-Power aggressors who can
use humanitarian intervention as a pretext for unlawful uses of
force. It is available to third world aggressors also. To come to the
policy question and put it bluntly: humanitarian intervention is so
blatantly open to spurious claims that it should not be
countenanced.
The second matter is the question of a little help from one's
friends. Professor Moore mentioned in this context article 51 of
the Charter, which refers to self-defense against an armed attack
that occurs against a Member of the United Nations. I think we
are probably agreed that the black letter of the Charter does not
permit assistance, since an internal conflict probably does not
come within the notion of "armed attack" as understood by the
founding fathers of the United Nations. The question is what kind
Determination and Aggression, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 2, 40-42 (1980). India's humani-
tarian intervention claims with respect to Bangladesh were in the half-hearted category also.
In fact, they seem for the most part to have been foisted on India by enthusiasts of the
doctrine. It has been asserted that "with the exception of some vague and controversial
allegations of self-defense by Indian spokesmen, India itself has not tried to justify its inter-
vention in East Pakistan on legal grounds. Specifically, she has not appealed to the doctrine
of humanitarian intervention." Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of
Humanitarian Intervention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L
L. J. 203 (1974). See also INTERNATIONAL COMMISSlON OF JURISTS, THE EvENTS IN EAST PAKI-
STAN, 1971 at 96 (1972): "It must be emphasized that humanitarian intervention is not the
ground of justification which India has herself put forward." Nevertheless, the Commission
concluded: "[W]e consider that India's armed intervention would have been justified if she
had acted under the doctrine of humanitarian intervention, and further that India would
have been entitled to act unilaterally under this doctrine in view of the growing and intoler-
able burden which the refugees were casting upon India and in view of the inability of inter-
national organizations to take any effective action to bring to an end the massive violations
of human rights in East Pakistan which were causing the flow of refugees." But see Franck
& Rodley, supra note 6, at 276 (quoting Indian statements in the Security Council which
seem to make an humanitarian intervention claim wrapped up in a claim that India was
assisting in the decolonization process, another dubious claim for using force in someone
else's territory).
"o Franck & Rodley, supra note 6, at 287 & n. 52 (most deaths occurred after
intervention).
" Clark, supra note 9, at 7-8.
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of analogies might one draw from the rules of article 51? I think all
the previous speakers are agreed that if there ever were normative
rules specifically dealing with the question of assistance upon re-
quest, they have long since lost their normative quality. What we
are talking about is developing new rules and developing some
kind of coherent policy to support these rules. I would like to sug-
gest in this context-and again I think that Professor Moore made
the point-that it is crucial to refer to the kinds of case studies
where the question has arisen, and to try to deal with ways of re-
sponding to those kinds of cases. I think, for example, of the prob-
lem of what to do about Czechoslovakia (which after all was justi-
fied by the USSR as a case of helping a friend) and of Afghanistan,
to which several references have been made.
Before coming to this colloquium, I examined my own eclectic
files to see if I could think of one or two examples that nobody else
would mention. Indeed, I have three that no one else has men-
tioned, so far at least. The first of them involved a request to the
New Zealand government. I think I have one of the few copies of
the relevant documents in captivity outside the New Zealand Min-
istry of Foreign Affairs. They consist of an exchange of letters be-
tween a gentleman named Dr. Quat and the then Prime Minister
of New Zealand, Mr. Holyoake, not so affectionately known as
Kiwi Keith." I do not know how many of you remember Dr. Quat,
but for a period he was in control in Saigon. In 1965 a letter came
under his name to New Zealand asking for assistance. The letter
made reference to the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization
(SEATO) Treaty. I have little doubt that Dr. Quat's letter was
drafted either in Washington or in the United States Embassy in
Saigon. Certainly, the pressure on New Zealand to help its friends
was really pressure to help the United States rather than the be-
leaguered Dr. Quat. It seems to me that one probably does not
want to devise a rule to support that kind of activity. Secondly, I
found in my files the invitation extended in November 1975 by
four minor political parties in East Timor to their Indonesian
Correspondence between the Prime Minister of the Republic of Vietnam, Dr. Phan
Huy Quat, and the Prime Minister of New Zealand, the Right Honourable Keith Holyoake,
concerning the offer of New Zealand combatant troops for service in the Republic of Viet-
nam. (These documents, printed by the New Zealand Government Printer in 1965, are set
up like publications in the New Zealand Treaty Series or Parliamentary Papers but do not
bear any Treaty Series or Parliamentary Paper numbers). For the way in which the Austra-
lian Government foisted its assistance on an unwilling Doctor Quat, see M. SEXTON, WAR
FOR THE ASKING: AusTRALIAN VriarAN SECRETS (1981).
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brothers to come in and save them.'" The four parties represented
only a small percentage of the population. That letter was proba-
bly drafted in Jakarta. The third situation is one where the good
guys and bad guys are not so clear. The Republic of Vanuatu, the
former New Hebrides, asked Papua New Guinea in 1980 for assis-
tance to deal with the secessionist movement in Espiritu Santo.""2
You will recall that the New Hebrides was a French-British condo-
minium known to the locals as a "pandemonium" because of the
way it worked from time to time. As the colonial powers departed
the scene, the place looked seriously as though it was going to
come unstuck. This left the new government in the very difficult
position of having to request the colonial powers to do something
about it at the last minute. France and Britain could not agree
sufficiently to do something, so it was necessary for Vanuatu to ask
its neighbor Papua New Guinea to engage in a little Melanesian
solidarity and provide assistance. Now I think that most of us
would agree that the Vanuatu situation would have been much
better handled through the United Nations or regional auspices.
The bottom line of all this is a policy question. The notion of
assisting one's friends is open to cynical manipulation. The chal-
lenge is to develop a prophylactic rule which will prohibit actions
in support of either faction. I would like to mention in this context,
and in conclusion, a proposition put forward by my distinguished
colleague, Tom Farer, some years ago in a wonderful article about
"Harnessing Rogue Elephants." Farer suggested that we develop
a rule that would legitimate assistance short of tactical military
support, either to incumbents or rebels, but that would prohibit
absolutely the commitment of combat troops, battlefield advisors,
or volunteers, no matter how few or how negligible their effect." I
would like to leave you with that thought as a possibility for the
development of a workable rule in this area.
's Text annexed to letter dated December 4, 1975, from the Permanent Representative of
Indonesia to the Secretary-General, 30 U.N. GAOR C.4 (Agenda Items 23 & 88) at 4, U.N.
Doc. A/C.4/808 (1975).
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